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SPEECH AT THE 50 YEARS OF THE INDIAN
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT SYMPOSIUM*
Battling for Human Rights in Indian Country
Presented by David Wilkins**

Good afternoon. I’m pleased to be back in Albuquerque. I thank
John LaVelle for inviting me to this important conference.
I am a citizen of the Lumbee Nation and a political scientist by
training, although I incorporate big doses of history and law in my teaching
and research, following the good advice of my mentor, Vine Deloria, Jr.
We have gathered to reflect on the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)1
in its 50th year of existence—to question and ponder where we go from
here. That discussion must include the meanings of consent, citizenship,
due process, civil rights and liberties, human rights, democracy, and, of
course, sovereignty.
Until enactment of the ICRA in 1968, while the Congress had
frequently exercised plenary power over native nations, it was generally
understood that neither the U.S. nor state constitutions nor their
amendments applied directly to tribes.
But with the enactment of the ICRA—credited in part to a Lumbee,
Helen Maynor Scheirbeck, who was an aide to Senator Sam Ervin on the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights—tribal governments had imposed
upon them certain specified restraints phrased in language taken from the
U.S. Bill of Rights but modified to fit the unique pre and extraconstitutional status of our nations. While some of our nations and
individual citizens embraced the act, many did not.
I was fortunate to know Helen and worked for her for a time, but I
came to more fully appreciate the Act’s long-term importance in the early
1980s when I studied under Vine Deloria, Jr. at the University of Arizona,
and a few years later, when as an instructor at Navajo Community (now
Dine) College, I witnessed the Navajo Nation’s battles to protect their
lands, treaties, and sovereignty from federal and especially state intrusions.
In the mid-90s, I began to hear about controversies surrounding the
issue of citizenship. Banishment, at first, and later disenrollment, were the
*
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terms used to describe a new method of depopulation that were beginning
to occur in parts of Indian Country. I found the practice so shocking that I
began to use the term “dismemberment” to describe the act of cutting off a
part of the tribal body—doing harm to both the politically discarded
individual and the Nation itself—taking place behind the cloak of native
sovereignty.
Native nations have always possessed the inherent authority to
denationalize any tribal member. Moreover, they wield the power, unknown
to any other sovereign in the United States, to formally exclude non-natives
from their territorial homelands. But far too many tribal nations are
engaging in banishment or disenrollment practices in clear violation of their
own historic values and principles, which at one time utilized peacemaking,
mediation, restitution, and compensation to resolve the inevitable disputes
that occasionally arose.
While I’m focusing on disenrollment today, it is interesting to note
that federal courts have sometimes allowed banished members to challenge
their punishment; but they have thus far refused to provide any substantive
justice to those who have been disenrolled, arguably the greater sanction.
Disenrollment was first used by Native governments against whites
who had acquired tribal citizenship dating back to 1897. In one case, the
Chickasaw Nation acted to disenfranchise a white man who had been
adopted. The Supreme Court in Roff v. Burney2 upheld the right of the
nation to decide who could be a citizen. The Cherokee and Osage also
disenrolled whites during this era.
The two earliest disenrollment cases I have found of native nations
seeking to permanently cast out their own citizens involved the Northern
Ute and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead--both in
the 1950s—as they internally battled over claims funds, termination, and
blood quantum.3
Today, dismemberments are happening for a variety of reasons, but
the two most apparent factors associated with the practice are increased
gambling revenue and civil violations or criminal activity that presumably
threatens community stability. Interestingly, there tends to be a correlation
between per capita distribution of large financial windfalls and
disenrollment, that is the legal and political termination of a tribal
member’s citizenship; whereas civil violations or criminal activity
(malfeasance, drug involvement, gang activity, etc.) in many cases lead to
banishment—the physical exclusion or expulsion from tribal lands without
loss of tribal citizenship. These two concepts are often conflated, but they
are in fact distinctive terms. In some contemporary tribal cases, however,
2
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they have become functionally similar.
In the pre-self-determination era, the federal government’s uneven
court rulings on the issues of allotment and membership mirrored the
vacillation of federal policy makers regarding tribal sovereignty. While the
federal courts were willing, at times, to issue rulings that suggested a
grudging respect for tribal self-determination on issues of membership,
more often they generally acknowledged in Congress and the executive
branch a significant, sometimes absolute, power over native nations’ right
to decide who belonged in their communities, who were entitled to benefit
from tribal resources, and who had the final say over questions of tribal
membership.
Although the ICRA extended to all “persons” in Indian Country a
modified statutory version of many of the rights laid out in the U.S. Bill of
Rights, the only remedy spelled out in that act is the writ of habeas corpus.
Habeas corpus, since the Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez4 decision in 1978,
has thus far not offered disenrolled Native individuals any substantial
justice, though it has provided a measured amount of success in a few cases
involving banishment.
The leading case on banishment that relied on habeas corpus is
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians (1996)5 where the court
concluded that while the five Seneca deserved the right to have the merits
of their claims heard by the district court, it also held that the sovereign
immunity of the Tonawanda Band must be respected and that the nation
could not be sued without its express consent.
But as important as Poodry has been, it has also been largely
ineffective in providing those facing disenrollment or banishment any
protection because in virtually all the litigation since 1996—federal, state,
or tribal—courts have generally adhered to the 1978 Martinez decision that
native governments are the final arbiters of membership decisions. As one
court put it “the decision of the [U.S.] Supreme Court in Santa Clara v.
Martinez reduces the degree of federal interference in tribal government
and requires that enforcement of the ICRA rest primarily in the Tribal
Courts.”6
While a few other cases involving banishment have attempted to
build upon the logic of Poodry--Sweet v. Hinzman, 20087 and 20098; and
Quair v. Sisco I and II, 20049, 200710--and have supported the
banished/disenrollees right to invoke habeas corpus, the remedy left to
those facing dismemberment was insufficient. In the court’s words in
4
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Quair I “[I]f the court concludes that petitioners were denied their rights to
procedural due process in connection with the decisions to disenroll them
and banish them from the reservation, the remedy is not reinstatement,
which would interfere with tribal sovereign immunity and internal tribal
affairs but, rather, a direction to provide appropriate due process, essentially
a re-hearing.”11 A case involving the United Auburn Tribe of California
might redefine how “detention” is interpreted under the ICRA if it’s
accepted by the United States Supreme Court.12
Generally, today it is safe to say that tribal courts have plenary
authority to determine membership for tribal purposes. The Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), Congress, and the federal courts will intervene in
tribal enrollment determinations in only a limited manner (habeas corpus),
if there is specific language in a tribe’s constitution or other organic
document requiring such involvement, or for broader reasons such as
federal distribution of tribal land (e.g., allotments) or money, or regarding
the creation of programs specifically for Indians. In these cases, the federal
government determines who is eligible, and may ignore or deny the tribe’s
membership policy and devise a standard of its own.
Dismembered natives are citizens of their states of residence and
have federal citizenship, as well. Theoretically, they should be the most
protected class in the land, armed as they are with three distinctive layers of
citizenship. Such, of course, has not proven to be the case. In regard to
native citizenship, tribal political elites can and are wielding a power--the
absolute power-- to terminate native citizenship---a power that even the
federal or state governments cannot wield over American citizens. As the
Supreme Court held in 1967 in Afroyim v. Rusk13, citizenship is an
inviolable right, and while it can be given away, it cannot be taken away. In
other words, involuntary expatriation, that is the stripping of citizenship, is
not an available penalty under any state or federal statute. As the court held,
“in our country people are sovereign and the government cannot sever its
relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship.”14
But in a number of cases, tribal judges have rendered rulings that
support the political elite’s right to denationalize native citizens. In one of
the more notorious cases involving the Nooksack Nation, a native judge in
2013 issued an opinion that devalued the very essence of native nationhood.
To her credit, it appeared that the judge was attempting to console the
disenrollees and explain a decision that gravely disappointed them.
11
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Unfortunately, she also utilized words that profoundly diminished
indigenous sovereignty:
While the court recognizes the important entitlements at stake
for the proposed disenrollees, this is a fundamentally different
proceeding than a loss of US citizenship… In the case of tribal
disenrollees, the disenrollee loses critical and important rights, but
they are not equal to the loss of US citizenship. A person who is
disenrolled from her tribe loses access to the privileges of tribal
membership, but she is not stateless. Though she loses the right, for
example, to apply for and obtain tribal housing through the Tribe,
her ability to obtain housing in general is unaffected; though she
loses the right to vote in tribal elections, she does not lose the right
to vote in federal, state, and local elections. While the impact on the
disenrollee is serious and detrimental, it is not akin to becoming
stateless.15
That a native judge would deem tribal nationhood and citizenship
inferior to U.S. statehood and citizenship is an unnerving perception to
fathom. It is difficult to believe she intended to weaken the idea of native
sovereignty even as her ruling assuredly reaffirmed it. It is this unconscious
paradigm shift within indigenous communities that may potentially do the
most profound harm to our peoples.
While it may be within a nation’s power to purge its own
population, it is nothing less than suicidal sovereignty. It is unthinkable that
natives now engage in modern versions of the forced removals and political
terminations suffered by their own ancestors at the hands of federal (or
colonial) lawmakers. It is a tragic example of colonized peoples becoming
exquisite purveyors of the same corrupt policies they once endured, all
while maintaining the naive belief that their actions are somehow different
or justified.
Ultimately, dismemberment policies could prove to be the final
stage in the completion of the colonizing cycle—the end of meaningful
tribal sovereignty. The power to denationalize natives is already adversely
impacting the integrity of the nations’ engaging in such tactics and will
prove detrimental to all nations if and when the federal government decides
to step in via congressional action or judicial opinion—which it did
regularly in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Once that happens there is no
certainty that our nations will retain the sovereignty that has been defended
since first contact.
So, what does it mean that the United States, a very large,
heterogeneous, secular state, has in place laws and policies that protect its
15
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citizens’ rights far more comprehensively than native nations which are
much smaller, more homogeneous, and ostensibly more kin-based polities?
For if native nations are indeed communities of kinfolk that are ancestrally,
culturally, psychologically, and territorially related, then it would appear
that the grounds on which to sever or terminate such a fundamentally
organic set of human relationships would have to be unequivocally clear
and would, in fact, rarely be carried out given the grave threat that such
actions—the literal depopulation of the community’s inhabitants, would
pose to the continued existence of the nation.
What does it mean that the only class of citizens in the United
States who cannot avail themselves of such sacrosanct rights are native
individuals?
The very concept of tribal sovereignty means that the people--the
tribal community members themselves--are the sovereign, not the
governing bodies of those nations. Tribal councils and other native
governing institutions have merely been delegated limited authority to
fulfill the needs and to protect, not destroy, the rights of the people and
should not have the power to sever their relationship to their people by
taking away that most important of statuses, the status of belonging to, of
having citizenship or membership in, an Indigenous nation and living on the
lands of their ancestors.
Of course, for many Indigenous peoples the very notion of
sovereignty is rooted in their creation accounts and their lands, suggesting
that their core identity flows not from human made constitutions, charters,
or ordinances but is directly linked to their ancient origin accounts and the
holy beings and sacred lands they are connected to.
The issue of our connection to land is a critical dimension. A while
back I spoke with an Aboriginal scholar, Christine Black, who said that for
native peoples in Australia there is an implicit understanding that belonging
was not just about belonging to a particular group of people, but also
belonging to a particular landscape—and to be banished indefinitely from
one’s own sacred lands had an even more debilitating impact on the mind
and spirit of the banished person, so this was something even the offended
community knew—that it ultimately did not have the spiritual authority to
make a categorical decision on who “belongs to country,” as Aborigines
say, because all were equally responsible in caring for one’s homeland,
even those who occasionally violated societal norms. I think too many of
our nations engaging in such activities have conveniently forgotten this
important reality.
Why, then, is legal, political, and cultural termination of a native
nation’s own kin occurring at such a heightened level now? Are the tribal
governmental officials engaged in such harsh decisions acting in a manner
that comports with the traditional notions of identity mentioned earlier, or
are they now acting like privileged and exclusive corporate clubs? What
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rights do the disenrolled or banished citizens have to contest this most
profound of severances? Can Native nations ensure justice and individual
civil rights for their citizens and still protect and exercise tribal sovereignty
in membership decisions? Finally, what role, if any, should the federal
government play in these contentious intra-tribal affairs, since those
dismembered also happen to be US citizens and are supposedly entitled to
the same basic civil liberties as all other citizens?
The United States purports to have a trust relationship with
federally recognized native nations and their citizens, which means it is
pledged with protecting the lands, rights, and resources of those peoples.
When Tribal governments are violating the rights of their own citizens,
including their vested property rights, the federal government as the
principal trust agent, I would argue, has a constitutional, moral, and treaty
responsibility to assist those individuals suffering such violations.
There are many ideas as to how to tackle this problem, including
the formation of an intertribal human rights treaty, an intertribal appellate
body, modifications to tribal constitutions or other governing documents,
encouraging disenrollees to organize and seek acknowledgment from the
federal government as a separate political entity, and utilizing the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and other
international protocols in an effort to provide a measure of justice.
And, in keeping with the theme of this conference, there have been
calls for amendments to the ICRA. This could be achieved, some have
argued, by waiving a tribe’s sovereign immunity if the tribal government
fails to fully comply with the due process safeguards outlined in the ICRA
and in many of their own organic acts.
Vine Deloria, Jr. prophetically once said of ICRA that, “the act is
deceptive in many of its provisions, and even its description in Senate
debate left a good deal to be desired as far as clarity was concerned. … The
irony of this situation is apparent. The Constitution does not apply to
American Indians in their tribal relations. It does not protect Indian tribes.
But, through a legislative act of Congress, some constitutional provisions
are made an applicable part of the relationship between an Indian tribe and
its members. As long as this situation exists, confusion and injustice will
continue to be visited upon Indian tribes.”16
In recent months, a number of positive events have transpired—
several nations have amended their constitutions, others have re-enrolled a
number of those who had been disenrolled, and a federal court ruled in
August 2017 that the Cherokee Freedmen had every right to be reinstated as
citizens of the Cherokee Nation.17
These developments give me cause for cautious optimism. But
16
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there is much yet to be done. Perhaps we start here today, by finding ways
to make the ICRA work better for all our relations.

